signing: rpm payload signing, key publication, consumer repo setup for #51

Implement the signing and consumer-repo trust infrastructure:

- Makefile: add generate-test-key, sign-rpm, checksums, clearsign targets;
  make release now automates the full build→sign→checksum→clearsign flow
- Key ceremony: document the import→sign→delete lifecycle, key rotation
  outline, and private-key-in-password-manager policy
- Public key: update placeholder with raw URL, algorithm, and ceremony ref
- Consumer docs: README now covers apt signed-by keyring flow, dnf repo
  file setup, signature verification commands, and migration runbook link
- Release spec: updated to reference ceremony doc and rpmsign workflow
- Tests: 36 structural signing tests (nfpm config, Makefile targets,
  repo file, key publication, ceremony doc, consumer docs, spec refs)
  plus throwaway-key RPM signature and clearsign mechanics; no network
  or real key required

Co-authored-by: CommandCodeBot <noreply@commandcode.ai>
This commit is contained in:
xavierk
2026-09-03 14:14:55 +05:30
co-authored by CommandCodeBot
parent c45b07003a
commit d8fa6df072
6 changed files with 809 additions and 48 deletions
+3 -3
View File
@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@
## 4. Signing and key policy
- **RPM payload: signed.** rpmsign with the dedicated packaging key, wired through the nfpm config. This is required, not optional: it is the only working dnf-native verification path.
- **RPM payload: signed.** rpmsign with the dedicated packaging key, invoked by `make sign-rpm` after the package is built. This is required, not optional: it is the only working dnf-native verification path.
- **deb: unsigned.** apt never verifies payload signatures; trust = instance-signed `InRelease` (signed-by keyring) + TLS + Acquire-By-Hash. Manual-download integrity is covered by SHA256SUMS.
- **SHA256SUMS: clearsigned** with the packaging key — the trust anchor for manually downloaded release assets, independent of TLS.
- **Packaging key:** single dedicated key, RSA 3072, UID `Fenris Packaging <packaging@bongbetic.com>`, 2-year expiry, no master/subkey hierarchy (single maintainer, manual builds). Private key lives in the password manager only; each release does import → sign → delete — nothing permanent on any build host.
- **Packaging key:** single dedicated key, RSA 3072, UID `Fenris Packaging <packaging@bongbetic.com>`, 2-year expiry, no master/subkey hierarchy (single maintainer, manual builds). Private key lives in the password manager only; each release does import → sign → delete — nothing permanent on any build host. The full ceremony is documented in `docs/install/signing-key-ceremony.md`.
- **Public key publication:** in-repo `packaging/keys/fenris-packaging.asc` (raw URL doubles as the `.repo` gpgkey target), release notes, docs page. No keyservers — TOFU-over-TLS.
- **Rotation (outline):** new key published alongside old; rpm signed with the new key; `fenris.repo` gpgkey lists both URLs (dnf accepts multiple); old key dropped after one release cycle. Procedure details stay in map fog.
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
- **A Release is:** a version tag, its packages in the channel, a Gitea release entry with notes, and a clearsigned SHA256SUMS — all together. **Bare tags are forbidden** (tag without packages + release entry is not a Release).
- **Cadence: on-demand.** Tag when user-visible changes or fixes accumulate; no calendar, no empty releases, no frequency SLA, no RC ceremony — fixes ship as a revision bump of the current version.
- **Versioning: plain semver.** Major = breaking CLI/config/unit change; store schema changes ride the natural bump (the forward-only refusal handles old-reader/new-store).
- **Promotion flow:** tag → `make release` (manual: `make package` + rpmsign + registry PUTs + attach `.deb`, `.rpm`, `SHA256SUMS` to the release entry).
- **Promotion flow:** tag → `make release` (automated: `make package` → RPM signing via nfpm → SHA256SUMS generation → clearsign → prints registry PUTs + Gitea release steps). The ceremony is documented in `docs/install/signing-key-ceremony.md`.
- **Rollback:** installing an older package over a newer store is **unsupported** — the store's forward-only version refusal fails it by design. Documented rollback = restore the observation-store snapshot, then install the old Release. No automatic downgrade machinery exists or will be built.
- **CI:** no runners are registered on the instance today ([Actions runner research](https://git.bongbetic.com/xavierk/Fenris/issues/37)), so the manual flow above is primary. A dormant `.gitea/workflows/release.yml` (`on: push: tags: ['v*']`, single job, host-mode runner) is committed alongside; if it fires, it replicates `make release`. Cheapest future upgrade: one `act_runner` static binary in host-label mode on the existing Gitea host.